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Introduction
At the 19th Conference of Parties (COP19) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2013 in Warsaw, Carbon Market Watch, an activist group dedicated to monitoring the Mechanism and other carbon trading bodies, hosted a side event during which the CDM came under scrutiny for "failing to protect human rights" due to serious weaknesses in stakeholder consultations and lack of global standards that would condition effective participation of local communities (Author's observations, Carbon Market compliance with institutional standards. Global environmental governance scholars have embarked on the ambitious venture of assessing the form and level of this influence in international arenas related to environmental policy-making, such as climate change negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2008; Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004; Humphreys 2008; Nasiritousi et al. 2016; Newell 2000 ).
Yet, we are reminded by Michel Foucault (1982 Foucault ( , 1997 ) that influence-when understood as power-is not merely something to be attained but must be constantly performed. It is a productive force contingent on multiple forms of resistance; it does not function in a linear influencer-to-influencee configuration but rather is a circulating and permeating process that creates "a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized" (Foucault 1982, p. 790) . From this perspective, activists' efforts to influence actors -such as state delegates during climate negotiationsconstitute a continuous struggle embedded in power relations that (re)produce specific discourses in the field of climate policy-making. These powerful narratives create fields of possibilities that, in return, affect how NGOs may respond to any form of resistance to their efforts to persuade, as they must be creative in finding opportunities or enacting established norms in attempting to change the agenda or policy (Foucault 1997; Hajer 1997; Litfin 1994) .
As Keck and Sikkink (1998, p. 5) observe, by functioning in socio-political contexts that contain not only contested but, particularly, stable and shared understandings, activists "operate strategically within the more stable universe of shared understandings" and, simultaneously, "they try to reshape certain contested meanings." In other words, to effectively contest policymakers and persuade them to implement changes, NGOs strategically embody their arguments with elements of dominant discourses that provide both shared understandings and powerful narratives. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006 , 2007 , 2016 identify three prevailing policy discourses of green governmentality, ecological modernization, and civic environmentalism that inform how climate decisionmaking under the UNFCCC is framed and enacted. According to these scholars, green governmentality is characterized by techno-administrative rationalism of a top-down "global gaze" approach favouring science-driven, expert-oriented problem-solving of environmental issues (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006, 2007) . In this view, the central role in global climate governance is reserved for networks of state administrators and professional experts (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016, p. 6-7) . As a result, green governmentality establishes climate change as an intergovernmental issue that is managed through multilateral agreements and institutions, a mode particularly advocated by the European Union (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007, p. 126) .
Ecological modernization, on the other hand, is a narrative informed by market rationality and neo-liberal economic principles (Dryzek 2013). It is, therefore, committed to the ideal of green growth achieved through effective implementation of market mechanisms (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016) . This discourse is characterized by a bottom-up, decentralized and multiactor approach to the climate change challenge by promoting a broad involvement of various stakeholders to increase accountability and legitimacy of decision-making, under the aegis of "good governance" (Bernstein 2001; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007; Kasperson 2006) . In terms of managing and mitigating environmental problems, ecological modernisation favours flexible, hybrid (public-private) and cost-effective solutions, making CDM a prime example of this political narrative.
According to Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006, 2007) , traces of both green governmentality and ecological modernization are present in the reformist branch of civic environmentalismthe third discourse identified by the scholars -that emphasizes the importance of deliberative policy-making and the role of transnational civil society activists whose advocacy is seen as helpful in enhancing input legitimacy of climate governance (Streck 2004; Streck and Lin 2008) . Since the establishment of flexible mechanisms through the adoption of Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the reform-oriented transnational activism has gradually embraced "reflexive" green governmentality and "strong" ecological modernization by mobilizing scientific and legal advocacy in an effort to improve accountability and legitimacy of global carbon markets (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007, p. 135; Hadden 2015, p. 25-29) . In contrast to the reformist version, the radical strain epitomizes deep scepticism about and harsh critique of both expert-driven green governmentality and market-based ecological modernization (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006, 2007) .
In their most recent study of meta-discourses in the post-Copenhagen climate governance, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2016) observe the return of radical civic environmentalism that dissociates itself from global managerialism of green governmentality and market-driven ecological modernization, by mobilizing critique of dominant power structures underpinning climate policy-making within the UNFCCC arena. This observation conflates with the latest findings provided by Fisher (2010) and Hadden (2014 Hadden ( , 2015 who argue that the 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen (COP15) marks the shift from conventional, science-based, and reform-oriented advocacy tactics towards a confrontational, radicalized and justice-based multi-issue framing of climate change. According to Fisher (2010, p. 15) , the climate justice movement mobilized civil society groups to participate at COP15 "against the climate regime and global capitalism more broadly." Similarly, in her meticulous study of transitional activist networks in global climate governance, Hadden (2015) illustrates how the conventional branch of "scientifically sophisticated" ENGOs appealing "to an insider contingency of experts" (p. 95) has been gradually outshone by an unconventional strain of radical civic environmentalism that, by employing the multi-issue framework of climate justice, voices its critique through contentious language and mobilizes arguments linking climate change to, among others, human rights. Following the post-Copenhagen spillover, civil society groups increasingly departed from scientific/legal language associated with environmental advocacy and intentionally adopted the justice-based framings in order to attract "less technical" constituencies and mobilize "a broader systemic critique" of climate governance (Hadden 2015, p. 31). More specifically, Nicholson and Chong (2011) illustrate that activists have increasingly mobilized human rights institutions and framings under the umbrella of climate justice. Jumping on the "human rights bandwagon", as these scholars contend (Nicholson and Chong 2011), might provide support for civil society groups in formulating and deploying more persuasive tactics that could "break existing impasses in climate change negotiations"
and "formulate more effective climate policies" (p. 121). Linking the human rights perspective with climate change under the umbrella of climate justice is particularly significant in terms of input legitimacy, because it helps refocus attention to individuals and communities that are excluded from decision-making processes (Nicholson and Chong, 2011) .
I argue that the insights on prevailing climate discourses (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006 , 2007 , 2016 and the findings on climate framings mobilised by activists (Fisher 2010; Hadden 2014 Hadden , 2015 Nicholson and Chong 2011) complement each other. When merged, they create an analytical device through which I trace and map framing strategies implemented by selected ENGOs in their efforts to shape and modify the rules related to transparency, public participation, and accountability in the CDM governance. Hence, since the conventional strain of climate change activism is characterized by science/legal-based framings and reformoriented arguments concerned with legitimizing climate governance through improvements of its structure and institutions, such advocacy strategies borrow elements from and position themselves within the discourses of green governmentality and ecological modernisation. The second strain-unconventional activism -represents a (re)turn to justice-based framings, contentious arguments, radicalisation of language and anti-systemic critique. In this sense, the unconventional repertoire of climate change activism resonates strongly in the discourse of radical civic environmentalism.
Three Phases of NGO Struggle
The Pre-Marrakech phase: Constructing the CDM Following its inception as one of three flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (UN 1998, Article 12) at COP3 in 1997, the CDM's legal structure was subject to negotiations between Parties from COP4 (1998) until agreement was reached at COP7 (2001) . The outcome of this process was the Marrakech Accords that specified "Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol" (UNFCCC 2002, Decision 17/CP.7). In the pre-Marrakech phase, CAN and CIEL were increasingly active in seeking opportunities to persuade government representatives to treat transparency and public participation in the CDM's legal framework.
At the early agenda-setting stage of COP4 and subsequent COP5, CAN's recommendations were modest in scope and generic in nature, for example, that a successful CDM should have a governance structure transparent to society and meaningfully involving a full range of stakeholders (CAN 1998 (CAN , 1999a Eddy 1999) . CIEL, on the other hand, elaborated on the matter and, based on its legal expertise contained in the study "Carbon Conservation" (Goldberg 1998), suggested that to ensure transparent and participatory CDM governance, four universally acknowledge legal-based principles had to be implemented, namely: informed and effective public participation; access to information; public participation and consultations; access to justice. In line with the discourse of green governmentality, these principles would thus provide administrators of CDM governance a top-down, legal-based rationale to manage input legitimacy. Furthermore, normative examples to these recommendations were made by referring to internationally recognized principles of multilateral institutions and agreements, such as the United Nations Conference 
The Human Rights Turn
The radical turn to human rights perspective in the framing tactics of CAN, CIEL, and CDM Watch promised to advance their efforts and took place at the conjunction of two and more diverse range of issues in order to appeal to a broader constituency. Consequently, some ENGOs -such as CAN -have drifted away from conventional ways of persuasion and, instead, have "increasingly embraced an issue framing that focuses on equity and justice issues" (Hadden 2015, 154) . Thus, under the umbrella of climate justice, various activist groups have now begun to also "strategically utilize human rights institutions, practices and discourses" (Nicholson and Chong 2011, 122) . 
Conclusions
The case analysed provides two sets of insights. On a general level, the findings indicate that the ENGOs studied have pursued their campaigns as a dynamic process during which activists seek ways to provide critique, arguments and recommendations by taking advantage of specific policy opportunities and circumstances in the climate negotiations under the UNFCCC, including: the pre-Marrakech agenda-setting phase with construction of CDM governance on the agenda; the post-Marrakech revision of the Mechanism's rules related to sinks and the appeal procedure; the registration of controversial CDM projects; and, most recently, the comprehensive review of the Mechanism's modalities and procedures.
